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Abstract
In several matching markets, in order to achieve diversity, agents’ priorities are
allowed to vary across an institution’s available seats, and the institution is let to
choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the
seats, called a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a charac-
terization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance
mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable ca-
pacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system
and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible
choice rules.
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1 Introduction
Many real-life resource allocation problems involve the allocation of an object that is
available in a limited number of identical copies, called the capacity of the object. Choice
rules, which are systematic ways of rationing available copies of an object when demand
exceeds the capacity, are essential in the analysis of such problems. A well-known example
is the school choice problem in which each school has a certain number of seats to be
allocated among students. Although student preferences are elicited from the students,
endowing each school with a choice rule is an essential part of the design process.
Which choice rule to use is not always evident. The school choice literature, start-
ing with the seminal study by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), has widely focused on
problems where each school is already endowed with a priority ordering over students
and chooses the highest priority students up to the capacity. Such a choice rule, which is
merely responsive to a given priority ordering, is called a responsive choice rule.1 However,
when there are additional concerns such as achieving a diverse student body or affirmative
action, which choice rule to use is non-trivial. For example in the Boston school choice
system, although each school is still endowed with a priority ordering over students and
respecting student priorities is still a concern, schools would like to promote the neighbor-
hood students as well by sometimes letting them override the priorities of students who
are not from the neighborhood. Such an objective can obviously not be achieved with a
responsive choice rule.
The affirmative action policies that are in use in several school districts2 reveal that
a natural way to achieve diversity is to allow students’ priorities to vary across a school’s
seats, and to let the school choose students in a lexicographic fashion based on a pre-
determined ordering of the seats. We call these rules (capacity-constrained) lexicographic
choice rules.3 To be more precise, a lexicographic choice rule specifies an ordering of the
1In Appendix D, we discuss responsive choice rules.
2In order to achieve a diverse student body, many school districts have been implementing affirmative
action policies, such as in Boston, Chicago, and Jefferson County.
3These choice rules are simply called lexicographic choice rules in the recent market design literature.
We introduce these choice rules using the capacity-constrained lexicographic choice terminology to differ-
entiate them from other lexicographic choice rules without capacity constraints which have been studied
in the choice theory literature. Although we omit the “capacity-constrained” part for simplicity in most
part of the paper, we include it in the statements of our results.
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seats and assigns a priority ordering to each seat, which can be interpreted as the crite-
rion based on which that particular seat will be assigned. At each choice set, the highest
priority student according to the priority ordering at the first seat is chosen, then the
highest priority ordering among the remaining students according to the priority ordering
at the second seat is chosen, and so on until the last seat is assigned or no student is
left. Although some properties of lexicographic choice rules have already been studied in
the literature, which set of properties distinguish lexicographic choice rules from other
plausible choice rules has so far not been studied.4 In this study, we follow the axiomatic
approach and discover general principles (axioms) that characterize lexicographic choice
rules under variable capacity constraints.5
In our baseline model, we consider a single decision maker who has a capacity con-
straint, such as a school with a limited number of seats. The decision maker encounters
choice problems which consist of a choice set (a set of alternatives, such as students who
demand a seat at the school) and a capacity. A choice rule, at each possible choice prob-
lem, chooses some alternatives from the choice set without exceeding the capacity. Note
that across different choice problems, we allow capacity to vary, since in applications ca-
pacity may vary and the choice rule may need to be responsive to changes in capacity.6
One example is when the number of available seats at a school may change from year to
year. In fact, even during the same admissions year, a school may face two different choice
problems with different capacities. In most of the existing school choice systems, such as
New York City and Boston, there is a second stage of admissions including those students
and school seats that are unassigned at the end of the first stage.7
We consider the following three properties of choice rules that have already been
studied in the axiomatic literature.
Capacity-filling:8 An alternative is rejected from a choice set at a capacity only if the
4Although lexicographic choice rules are used to achieve diversity in school choice, there are other
plausible choice rules that are also used, or can be used, to achieve diversity or affirmative action. Among
others, Echenique and Yenmez (2015) and Ehlers et al. (2014) study some of those choice rules.
5Echenique and Yenmez (2015) also follow an axiomatic approach and characterize several choice rules
for a school that wants to achieve diversity.
6There are earlier studies in the literature which also formulate choice rules by allowing capacity to
vary. See, among others, Dog˘an and Klaus (2018), Ehlers and Klaus (2014), and Ehlers and Klaus (2016).
7The new school choice system in Chicago also has two stages of admissions. See Dog˘an and Yenmez
(2019) for an analysis of the new system in Chicago.
8In the matching literature, capacity-filling is also referred to as acceptance, although the capacity-filling
3
capacity is full;
Gross substitutes: If an alternative is chosen from a choice set at a capacity, then it
is also chosen from any subset of the choice set that contains the alternative, at the same
capacity.
Monotonicity: If an alternative is chosen from a choice set at a capacity, then it is
also chosen from the same choice set at any higher capacity.
We introduce a new property called the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. The
irrelevance of accepted alternatives requires that, if the set of rejected alternatives is the
same for two choice sets at the same capacity, then at any higher capacity, the set of
accepted alternatives that were formerly rejected should be the same for the two choice
sets. In other words, in case of an increase in the capacity, the irrelevance of accepted
alternatives requires that the new alternatives that will be chosen (if any) should not
depend on the already accepted alternatives. In Theorem 1, we show that a choice rule
satisfies capacity-filling, gross substitutes, monotonicity, and the irrelevance of accepted
alternatives if and only if it is lexicographic: there exists a list of priority orderings over
potential alternatives such that at each choice problem, the set of chosen alternatives is
obtainable by choosing, first, the highest ranked alternative according to the first priority
ordering, then choosing the highest ranked alternative among the remaining alternatives
according to the second priority ordering, and proceeding similarly until the capacity is
full or no alternative is left.
Besides providing a first axiomatic foundation for lexicographic choice rules under
variable capacity constraints, we also analyze the market design implications of lexico-
graphic choice rules. In Section 4, we consider the variable-capacity object allocation
model where there is more than one object (such as many schools) and agents have pref-
erences over objects (such as students having preferences over schools). In that model,
Ehlers and Klaus (2016) characterize deferred acceptance mechanisms where each object
has a choice rule that satisfies capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and monotonicity.9 Mo-
tivated by the irrelevance of accepted alternatives for choice rules, we introduce a new
terminology has been increasingly popular in the recent literature.
9Kojima and Manea (2010) consider a setup where the capacity of each school is fixed, and characterize
deferred acceptance mechanisms where each school has a choice rule that satisfies capacity-filling and gross
substitutes.
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property for allocation mechanisms, called the irrelevance of satisfied demand. Consider
an arbitrary problem and the allocation chosen by the mechanism at that problem. Sup-
pose that the capacity of an object is increased. Now, some of the agents who prefer that
object to their assignments at the initial allocation may receive the object due to the capac-
ity increase. The irrelevance of satisfied demand requires that the set of agents who receive
the object due to the capacity increase does not depend on the set of agents who initially
receive the object. We show that there is no mechanism which satisfies the irrelevance of
satisfied demand together with some other desirable properties studied in Ehlers and Klaus
(2016) (Proposition 3). In particular, lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanisms, which
are deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice struc-
ture, violate the irrelevance of satisfied demand, which stands in contrast to lexicographic
choice rules satisfying the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. However, we show that
a weaker version of the irrelevance of satisfied demand–which requires the same at any
problem where there is only one available object–characterizes lexicographic deferred ac-
ceptance mechanisms together with the desirable properties studied in Ehlers and Klaus
(2016) (Proposition 4).
Kominers and So¨nmez (2016) study lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanisms in
a more general matching with contracts framework (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). In some
applications, the choice rule of an institution is subject to a feasibility constraint, in the
sense that some alternatives cannot be chosen together with some other alternatives. The
matching with contracts model due to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduced a general
framework that incorporates such feasibility constraints into the matching problem. Al-
though for the school choice application, where such feasibility constraints are not binding,
the lexicographic choice rules in Kominers and So¨nmez (2016) fall into our baseline model,
in case of binding feasibility constraints, their lexicographic choice rules are not covered in
our baseline analysis.10 In Section 3.1, we show that our baseline model and our baseline
properties can be extended to a setup with feasibility constraints, highlighting the distin-
guishing properties of capacity-constrained lexicographic choice rules, including the ones
discussed in Kominers and So¨nmez (2016), in a more general setup.
Boston school district is one of the school districts that uses capacity-constrained
10For instance, the lexicographic choice rules in their setup may violate “substitutability”, which is a
generalization of gross substitutes to the matching with contracts setup (Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005).
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lexicographic choice to achieve a diverse student body and implement affirmative action
policies. Boston school district aims to give priority to neighborhood applicants for half
of each school’s seats. To achieve this goal, the Boston school district has been using a
deferred acceptance mechanism based on a choice structure, where each school is endowed
with a “capacity-wise lexicographic” choice rule, that is, at each capacity, the choice rule
lexicographically operates based on a list containing as many priority orderings as the
capacity, yet the lists for different capacity levels do not have to be related in any way.11
Dur et al. (2013) and Dur et al. (2018) analyse how the order of the priority orderings in
the choice rule of a school may cause additional bias for or against the neighbourhood
students.12 In Section 5, we consider a class of capacity-wise lexicographic choice rules
discussed in Dur et al. (2013) that are relevant for the design of the Boston school choice
system and show that our analysis enables us to single out one rule from four plausible
candidates.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In
Section 3, we introduce and characterize lexicographic choice rules, show that our baseline
model and our baseline properties can be extended to a setup with feasibility constraints,
and also provide a characterization of responsive choice rules. In Section 4, we highlight
an implication of our choice theoretical analysis for the resource allocation framework: we
provide a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a
lexicographic choice structure. In Section 5, we discuss some implications for the Boston
school choice system. In Section 6, we conclude by discussing the main features of our
analysis.
2 Related Literature
Several studies investigate choice rules that satisfy path independence (Plott, 1973), which
requires that if the choice set is “split up” into smaller sets, and if the choices from the
smaller sets are collected and a choice is made from the collection, the final result should
be the same as the choice from the original choice set. Since capacity-filling together
11See Dur et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion of Boston’s school choice mechanism.
12Dur et al. (2013) is an earlier version of Dur et al. (2018).
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with gross substitutes imply path independence,13 lexicographic choice rules are examples
of path independent choice rules. Aizerman and Malishevski (1981) show that for each
path independent choice rule, there exists a list of priority orderings such that the choice
from each choice set is the union of the highest priority alternatives in the priority order-
ings.14 Among others, Plott (1973), Moulin (1985), and Johnson and Dean (2001) study
the structure of path independent choice rules. Path independent choice rules guarantee
the existence of stable matchings in the matching context. Chambers and Yenmez (2017)
study path independence in the matching context and its connection to stable matchings.
Although the structure of path independent choice rules have been extensively studied,
the structure of lexicographic choice rules and what properties distinguish them from other
path independent choice rules have not been well-understood. Houy and Tadenuma (2009)
consider two classes of choice rules which are both based on “lexicographic procedures”,
yet different than the ones we consider here. Similar to our setup, choice rules that they
consider operate based on a list of binary relations.15 Yet, their model does not include
capacity constraints and the lexicographic procedures that operationalize the lists are
different. The only study that considers lexicographic choice rules that we study from an
axiomatic perspective is Chambers and Yenmez (2018a). They show that lexicographic
choice rules satisfy capacity-filling and path independence, and they also show that there
are path independent choice rules that are not lexicographic, but they do not provide a
characterization of lexicographic choice rules.
Our analysis of the Boston school choice system is related to Dur et al. (2018) and
the working paper version Dur et al. (2013). Dur et al. (2013) compare alternative choice
rules for schools in the Boston school district (one of which is the one used in the Boston
school district) in terms of how much they are biased for or against the neighbourhood
students. We consider these alternative choice rules from a different perspective. In
Section 5, we show that, although these choice rules are all based on a “lexicographic
procedure” at each capacity, only one of them satisfies all the characterizing properties in
13This is also noted in Remark 1 of Dog˘an and Klaus (2018), and it follows from Lemma 1 of
Ehlers and Klaus (2016) together with Corollary 2 of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981).
14In the words of Aizerman and Malishevski (1981), each path independent choice rule is generated by
some mechanism of collected extremal choice.
15Houy and Tadenuma (2009) do not start with any assumptions on the list of binary relations. They
separately discuss under which assumptions on the list of binary relations, the resulting choice rules satisfy
certain properties.
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Theorem 1, and therefore only one of them is actually a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic
choice rule. The common feature of Dur et al. (2018) and our Section 5 is that we both
consider lexicographic choice procedures in the context of school choice in Boston. The
main difference is that, although the choice rules that Dur et al. (2018) consider have
direct counterparts in a variable capacity context, their analysis pertains to the fixed
capacity case. In particular, given a fixed school capacity, Dur et al. (2018) analyze how
different lexicographic choice procedures perform. On the other hand, variable capacities,
and properties related to variable capacities, are at the heart of our study. We show that,
one of our variable capacity properties, CWARP, is satisfied by only one of the four choice
rules discussed in Dur et al. (2013).
3 Capacity-Constrained Lexicographic Choice
Let A be a nonempty finite set of n alternatives and let A denote the set of all nonempty
subsets of A. A (capacity-constrained) choice problem is a pair (S, q) ∈ A×{1, . . . , n} of
a choice set S and a capacity q. A (capacity-constrained) choice rule C : A×{1, . . . , n} →
A associates with each problem (S, q) ∈ A× {1, . . . , n}, a set of choices C(S, q) ⊆ S such
that |C(S, q)| ≤ q. Given a choice rule C, we denote the set of rejected alternatives at a
problem (S, q) by R(S, q) = S \ C(S, q).
A priority ordering ≻ is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation
over A. A priority profile pi = (≻1, . . . ,≻n) is an ordered list of n priority orderings.
Let Π denote the set of all priority profiles.
A choice rule C is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic for a priority profile
(≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Π if for each (S, q) ∈ A × {1, . . . , n}, C(S, q) is obtained by choosing
the highest ≻1-priority alternative in S, then choosing the highest ≻2-priority alternative
among the remaining alternatives, and so on until q alternatives are chosen or no alter-
native is left. A choice rule is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic if there exists a
priority profile for which the choice rule is lexicographic.
Remark 1. Note that, if a choice rule is lexicographic for a priority profile pi = (≻1, . . . ,≻n),
then it is lexicographic for any other priority profile that is obtained from pi by replacing ≻n
with an arbitrary priority ordering. In that sense, the last priority ordering is redundant.
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We consider four properties of choice rules. The following three properties are already
known in the literature.
Capacity-filling: An alternative is rejected from a choice set at a capacity only if the
capacity is full. Formally, for each (S, q) ∈ A× {1, . . . , n},
|C(S, q)| = min{|S|, q}.
Gross substitutes:16 If an alternative is chosen from a choice set at a capacity, then it
is also chosen from any subset of the choice set that contains the alternative, at the same
capacity. Formally, for each (S, q) ∈ A×{1, . . . , n} and each pair a, b ∈ S such that a 6= b,
if a ∈ C(S, q), then a ∈ C(S\{b}, q).
Monotonicity: If an alternative is chosen from a choice set at a capacity, then it is
also chosen from the same choice set at any higher capacity. Formally, for each (S, q) ∈
A× {1, . . . , n− 1},
C(S, q) ⊆ C(S, q + 1).
We now introduce a new property called the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. Con-
sider a problem and the set of rejected alternatives for that problem. Suppose that the
capacity increases. The property requires that which alternatives among the currently
rejected alternatives will be chosen (if any) should not depend on the currently accepted
alternatives. In other words, if the set of rejected alternatives are the same for two choice
sets (note that the set of accepted alternatives may be different), then at any higher ca-
pacity, the set of initially rejected alternatives that become accepted should be the same
for the two choice sets.
Irrelevance of accepted alternatives: For each S, S ′ ∈ A and each q ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
if R(S, q) = R(S ′, q), then C(S, q + 1) ∩ R(S, q) = C(S ′, q + 1) ∩R(S ′, q).
16Gross substitutes was first introduced in the choice literature by Chernoff (1954). It has been studied
in the choice literature under different names such as Chernoff’s axiom, Sen’s α, or contraction consistency.
In the matching literature, it was first studied and referred to as gross substitutes in Kelso and Crawford
(1982) (substitutability is also a commonly used name in the matching literature). We follow the termi-
nology of Kelso and Crawford (1982).
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We also introduce another property called capacity-wise weak axiom of revealed pref-
erence which will be helpful in our analysis. Consider the following capacity-wise revealed
preference relation. An alternative a ∈ A is revealed to be preferred to an alternative
b ∈ A at a capacity q > 1 if there is a problem with capacity q − 1 for which a and b are
both rejected and a is chosen over b when the capacity is q. That is, a is revealed to be
preferred to b at q if there exists S ∈ A such that a, b /∈ C(S, q − 1), a ∈ C(S, q), and
b ∈ R(S, q). Capacity-wise weak axiom of revealed preference requires, for each capacity,
the revealed preference relation to be asymmetric.
Capacity-wise weak axiom of revealed preference (CWARP): For each capacity
q > 1 and each pair a, b ∈ A, if a is revealed to be preferred to b at q, then b is not revealed
to be preferred to a at q.
CWARP is a counterpart of the well-known weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP)
in the standard revealed preference framework (Samuelson, 1938), where there is no capac-
ity parameter. In the standard framework, an alternative is said to be revealed preferred
to another alternative if there is a choice set at which the former alternative is chosen over
the latter. WARP requires the revealed preference relation to be asymmetric, which in a
sense requires consistency of the choice behavior in responding to changes in the choice set.
In our framework, the preference is revealed not only through the choice at a choice set,
but also through a change in the capacity. Therefore, what should be the counterpart of
the “revealed preference relation” is not entirely clear. We propose the following definition.
An alternative is revealed to be preferred to another at a capacity if there is a choice set
in which the former alternative is chosen over the latter at that capacity, although if the
capacity were one less, none of the alternatives would have been chosen. Put differently, if
none of the two alternatives are chosen in a choice set at a given capacity, but one of them
is chosen when capacity increases by one, this means the chosen alternative is revealed
to be preferred to the unchosen one. CWARP requires the revealed preference relation to
be asymmetric. Hence, CWARP requires consistency of the choice behavior in responding
to changes in the choice set together with changes in the capacity. Additionally, one can
interpret CWARP as a “no complementarities” condition, in the sense that CWARP re-
quires the new alternative to be chosen due to the capacity increase be independent of the
alternatives that have already been chosen. For example, if two alternatives are comple-
ments, then the choice of each one of these alternatives may depend on whether the other
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one has already been chosen or not. CWARP rules out this type of choice behavior.
Remark 2. The following is an alternative definition of CWARP, which is formulated in
line with the common formulations of WARP-type revealed preference relations in the
literature.
An alternative definition of CWARP: For each capacity q > 1, each pair S, T ∈ A and
each pair a, b ∈ S ∩ T such that [C(S, q − 1) ∪ C(T, q − 1)] ∩ {a, b} = ∅,
if a ∈ C(S, q) and b ∈ C(T, q) \ C(S, q), then a ∈ C(T, q).
Lemma 1. If a choice rule satisfies capacity-filling, monotonicity, and CWARP, then it
also satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Proof. Let C be a choice rule. Suppose that C satisfies capacity-filling and monotonicity,
but violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. By violation of the irrelevance of
accepted alternatives, there are S, S ′ ∈ A and q ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} such that R(S, q) =
R(S ′, q), but C(S, q+1)∩R(S, q) 6= C(S ′, q+1)∩R(S ′, q). By monotonicity, R(S, q+1) ⊆
R(S, q) and R(S ′, q + 1) ⊆ R(S ′, q). By capacity-filling, |R(S, q + 1)| = |R(S ′, q + 1)|.
Then, there exist a, b ∈ R(S, q) = R(S ′, q) such that a ∈ C(S, q + 1), b /∈ C(S, q + 1),
b ∈ C(S ′, q+1), and a /∈ C(S ′, q+1). But then, a is revealed preferred to b and vice versa,
implying that C violates CWARP.
In Appendix A, we show that each of the three properties capacity-filling, mono-
tonicity, and CWARP is necessary for the implication in Lemma 1, that is, we provide
examples of choice rules which violate exactly one of the three properties and also violate
the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
The following example shows that there exists a choice rule that satisfies capacity-
filling, monotonicity, and the irrelevance of accepted alternatives, but violates CWARP.
Example 1. Let A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let ≻ and ≻′ be defined as a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e and
a ≻′ c ≻′ b ≻′ d ≻′ e. Let the choice rule C be defined as follows. For each problem
(S, q), if d ∈ S, then C(S, q) chooses the highest ≻-priority alternatives from S until
q alternatives are chosen or no alternative is left;17 if d /∈ S, then C(S, q) chooses the
17That is, C(S, q) coincides with the choice rule that is “responsive” for ≻. We discuss responsive choice
rules in Section D.
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highest ≻′-priority alternatives from S until q alternatives are chosen or no alternative is
left. Note that C clearly satisfies capacity-filling and monotonicity. To see that C also
satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives, let S, S ′ ∈ A and q ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} be
such that R(S, q) = R(S ′, q). If d ∈ S ∩S ′ or d ∈ A\ (S ∪S ′), then C(S, q+1)∩R(S, q) =
C(S ′, q + 1) ∩ R(S ′, q). So suppose, without loss of generality, that d ∈ S \ S ′. Since
R(S, q) = R(S ′, q), we have d ∈ C(S, q). But then, either R(S, q) = ∅ or R(S, q) = {e}.
In either case, we have C(S, q+1)∩R(S, q) = C(S ′, q+1)∩R(S ′, q). To see that C violates
CWARP, note that C({a, b, c, d}, 1) = {a} and C({a, b, c, d}, 2) = {a, b}, implying that b is
revealed preferred to c at q = 2. Also, C({a, b, c, e}, 1) = {a} and C({a, b, c, e}, 2) = {a, c},
implying that c is revealed preferred to b at q = 2.
Theorem 1. A choice rule is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic if and only if it satisfies
capacity-filling, gross substitutes, monotonicity, and the irrelevance of accepted alterna-
tives.18
Proof. Let C be lexicographic for (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Π. Clearly, C satisfies capacity-filling and
monotonicity, and it is already known from the literature that C satisfies gross substitutes
(Chambers and Yenmez, 2018a). To see that it satisfies CWARP, let a, b ∈ A and q ∈
{2, . . . , n} be such that a is revealed preferred to b at q. Then, there is S ∈ A such that
a, b ∈ R(S, q − 1), a ∈ C(S, q), and b ∈ R(S, q). But then, a ≻q b. If also b is revealed
preferred to a at q, then by similar arguments we have b ≻q a, contradicting that ≻q
is antisymmetric. Thus, the revealed preference relation is asymmetric and C satisfies
CWARP. By Lemma 1, C also satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Let C be a choice rule satisfying capacity-filling, gross substitutes, monotonicity, and
the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. We first construct a priority profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈
Π and then show that C is lexicographic for that priority profile. For each i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
let aij denote the j’th ranked alternative in ≻i (for instance, ai1 is the highest ≻i-priority
alternative).
To construct ≻1, first set {a11} = C(A, 1). For each j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, set {a1j} = C(A\
{a11, . . . , a1(j−1)}, 1). To construct ≻2, consider C(A, 2). By capacity-filling, |C(A, 2)| = 2.
Since a11 ∈ C(A, 1), by monotonicity, a11 ∈ C(A, 2). Set {a21} = C(A, 2) \ {a11}. For
each j ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, set {a2j} = C(A \ {a21, a22, . . . , a2(j−1)}, 2) \ {a11}. Set a2n = a11.
18Independence of the characterizing properties is shown in Appendix B.
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The rest of the priority profile is constructed recursively as follows. For each i ∈
{3, . . . , n}, first set {ai1} = C(A, i) \ {a11, a21, . . . , a(i−1)1} (Note that by monotonic-
ity, {a11, a21, . . . , a(i−1)1} ⊆ C(A, i) and by capacity-filling, |C(A, i)| = i). For each
j ∈ {2, . . . , n−i+1}, set {aij} = C(A\{ai1, ai2, . . . , ai(j−1)}, i)\{a11, a21, . . . , a(i−1)1}. Note
that there are i − 1 rankings yet to be set in ≻i, which are {ai(n−i+2), . . . , ain}. For each
j ∈ {n− i+ 2, . . . , n}, set aij = a(j+i−n−1)1 (which assigns the alternatives a11, . . . , a(i−1)1
to the rankings ai(n−i+2), . . . , ain, respectively).
Now, let (S, q) ∈ A×{1, . . . , n}. Let b1 denote the highest ≻1-priority alternative in
S, b2 denote the highest ≻2-priority alternative among the remaining alternatives, and so
on up to bmin{|S|,q}. We show that C(S, q) = {b1, . . . , bmin{|S|,q}}. If min{|S|, q} = |S|, then
by capacity-filling, C(S, q) = {b1, . . . , b|S|}. Suppose that |S| > q.
The rest of the proof is by induction: we first show that b1 ∈ C(S, q); then, for
an arbitrary i ∈ {2, . . . , q}, assuming that b1, . . . , bi−1 ∈ C(S, q), we show that bi ∈
C(S, q). Let b1 = a1j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By the construction of ≻1, b1 ∈ C(A \
{a11, . . . , a1(j−1)}, 1). Then, by gross substitutes and monotonicity, b1 ∈ C(S, q).
Let i ∈ {2, . . . , q}. Assuming that b1, . . . , bi−1 ∈ C(S, q), we show that bi ∈ C(S, q).
Let S ′ be the choice set obtained from S by replacing b1 with a11 (note that nothing
changes if b1 = a11), replacing b2 with a21, . . ., and replacing bi−1 with a(i−1)1. That is, S
′ =
(S \ {b1, . . . , bi−1}) ∪ {a11, . . . , a(i−1)1}. Let q
′ = i− 1. Note that {b1, . . . , bi−1} = C(S, q
′),
because otherwise, by capacity-filling, there is a ∈ S such that a ∈ C(S, q′) and a /∈ C(S, q),
which is a violation of monotonicity. Also, by the construction of the priority profile and
by gross substitutes, {a11, . . . , a(i−1)1} = C(S
′, q′). Note that R(S, q′) = R(S ′, q′). By
monotonicity and the irrelevance of accepted alternatives, we have R(S, q) = R(S ′, q).
Since bi ∈ C(S
′, q) by the construction of the priority profile and by gross substitutes, we
also have bi ∈ C(S, q).
Corollary 1. A choice rule is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic if and only if it satisfies
capacity-filling, gross substitutes, monotonicity, and CWARP.
Proof. A lexicographic choice rule satisfies capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and mono-
tonicity by Theorem 1. Also note that in the proof Theorem 1, we showed that a lexi-
cographic choice rule satisfies CWARP as well. To see the other direction, note that by
Lemma 1, capacity-filling, monotonicity, and CWARP imply the irrelevance of accepted
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alternatives and the rest follows by Theorem 1.
There is never a unique priority profile for which a given choice rule is lexicographic.
However, if C is lexicographic for two different priority profiles (≻1, . . . ,≻n) and (≻
′
1
, . . . ,≻′n), then for each pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A, if a ≻t b and b ≻
′
t a for some
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then a or b must be chosen from any choice set (particularly from A) at
any capacity q < t. That is, a or b is chosen irrespective of their relative ranking at the
t’th priority ordering.
To state this observation formally, for each priority ordering ≻i on A and for each
choice set S ∈ A, let ≻i |S stand for the restriction of ≻i to S. Let A1 = A, and for each
t ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let At = A \ C(A, t − 1). For each choice set S ∈ A and each priority
ordering ≻i, let max(S,≻i) be the top-ranked alternative in S according to ≻i.
Proposition 1. If a choice rule C is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic for a priority
profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n), then C is lexicographic for another priority profile (≻
′
1, . . . ,≻
′
n) if
and only if ≻1 =≻
′
1 and for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ≻t |At =≻
′
t |At.
Proof. (If part) Let choice rule C be lexicographic for a priority profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n).
Suppose (≻′1, . . . ,≻
′
n) is such that ≻1 = ≻
′
1 and for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ≻t |At = ≻
′
t |At.
Now, for each S ∈ A and t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if t = 1, then since ≻1=≻
′
1, the conclusion is
immediate. Then, by proceeding inductively, for each 1 < t ≤ |S|, since C is lexicographic
for (≻1, . . . ,≻n), max(S \C(S, t−1),≻t) = C(S, t)\C(S, t−1). Since S \C(S, t−1) ⊂ At
and ≻t |At =≻
′
t |At, we get max(S \C(S, t−1),≻
′
t) = C(S, t) \C(S, t−1). It follows that
C is lexicographic for (≻′1, . . . ,≻
′
n).
(Only if part) For each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let At stand for the collection of all nonempty
subsets of At with at least t elements. Then, define the choice function ct : At → At
such that for each choice set S ∈ At, ct(S) = C(S, t) \ C(S, t − 1). Since C satisfies
gross substitutes, ct also satisfies gross substitutes. It follows that there is a unique priority
ordering ≻∗t such that ct(S) = max{S \ C(S, t − 1),≻
∗
t}. Therefore, if C is lexicographic
for some (≻1, . . . ,≻n), then for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ≻t |At =≻
∗
t .
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3.1 Lexicographic Choice Under Feasibility Constraints
In some applications, the choice rule of an institution is subject to a feasibility constraint.
For example, a firm may encounter a choice set which includes signing the same worker
under different terms, such as different salaries as modeled in Kelso and Crawford (1982),
and it may not be possible to choose the same worker under several terms even when
there is enough capacity (for instance, it is not possible to choose the same worker un-
der different salaries). The matching with contracts model due to Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005) introduced a general framework that incorporates such feasibility constraints into
the matching problem, which led to several new applications of matching theory such as
cadet-branch matching by So¨nmez and Switzer (2013) and So¨nmez (2013), and matching
with slot-specific priorities by Kominers and So¨nmez (2016). In this section, we will show
that our baseline model and our baseline properties can be extended to a setup with fea-
sibility constraints, highlighting the distinguishing properties of lexicographic choice rules
in a more general setup. As in the baseline model, let A be a nonempty finite set of n
alternatives and let A denote the set of all nonempty subsets of A. In addition, let F ⊆ A
be a nonempty set of feasible sets. We assume that F is downward closed in the sense
that for each S ∈ F and each S ′ ⊆ S, S ′ ∈ F .19 We also assume that each singleton is
feasible, i.e. for each a ∈ A, {a} ∈ F .20
A (feasibility-constrained) choice rule C : A×{1, . . . , n} → F associates with each
problem (S, q) ∈ A×{1, . . . , n}, a nonempty set of choices C(S, q) ⊆ S which is feasible, i.e.
C(S, q) ∈ F , and respects the capacity constraint, i.e. |C(S, q)| ≤ q. Given a choice rule
C, we denote the set of rejected alternatives at a problem (S, q) by R(S, q) = S \ C(S, q).
Our new framework encompasses the matching with contracts framework in the fol-
lowing way. Suppose that each alternative is a contract consisting of a pair: an agent and
a contractual term. Suppose that a choice set is feasible if it includes, for each agent, at
most one contract including that agent. It is easy to see that F is downward closed and
it includes the singletons.
A feasibility-constrained choice rule C is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic if
19In a matching with contracts model with distributional constraints, Goto et al. (2017) introduce the
concept of a “hereditary” distributional constraint, which implies that F is downward closed.
20Note that, given downward closedness, this is equivalent to requiring that each alternative belongs to
at least one feasible set.
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there exists a priority profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Π such that for each (S, q) ∈ A× {1, . . . , n},
C(S, q) is obtained by choosing the highest ≻1-priority alternative in S, then choosing the
highest ≻2-priority alternative among the remaining alternatives that induces a feasible set
together with the previously chosen alternative,21 and so on as long as there is a remaining
alternative until finally choosing the highest ≻q-priority alternative among the remaining
alternatives that induces a feasible set together with the previously chosen alternatives.
F-capacity-filling: An alternative is rejected from a choice set at a capacity only if the
capacity is full or it is infeasible to choose the alternative. Formally, for each (S, q) ∈
A× {1, . . . , n} and a ∈ S, if a /∈ C(S, q), then either |C(S, q)| = q or C(S, q) ∪ {a} /∈ F .
Let us adopt the convention that for each S ∈ A, C(S, 0) = ∅. Now, for each capacity
q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a is revealed to be F-preferred to b at q, denoted by a RFq b, if there
exists S ∈ A such that a, b /∈ C(S, q − 1), and a ∈ C(S, q) but b /∈ C(S, q), although
C(S, q − 1) ∪ {b} ∈ F . We introduce the following property which requires, for each
capacity, the revealed preference relation be acyclic.
Capacity-wise strong axiom of revealed preference (CSARP): For each capacity
q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, RFq is acyclic.
Proposition 2. A feasibility-constrained choice rule is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic
if and only if it satisfies F-capacity-filling, monotonicity, and the capacity-wise strong ax-
iom of revealed preference.
Proof. (Only if part:) Let C be a feasibility-constrained choice rule that is lexicographic
for (≻1, . . . ,≻n). Using similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can easily
verify that C satisfies F -capacity-filling and monotonicity.
To see that C satisfies CSARP, note that for each capacity q ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a, b ∈ A,
if a RFq b, then we must have a ≻q b. Since ≻q is transitive, R
F
q is acyclic.
(If part:) Let C be a feasibility-constrained choice rule that satisfies F -capacity-filling,
monotonicity, and CSARP. It follows from CSARP that for each q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, RFq is
acyclic. Now, for each capacity q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let ≻q be any completion of the transitive
21Formally, let a be the highest ≻1-priority alternative in S. Let S′ = {b ∈ S \ {a} : {a, b} ∈ F}. Then,
the highest ≻2-priority alternative among the remaining alternatives that induces a feasible set together
with the previously chosen alternative is max{S′,≻2}.
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closure of RFq . Next, we show that C is lexicographic for (≻1, . . . ,≻n). To see this, we
apply induction on capacity q. Before proceeding, let us introduce some notation. For
each S, T ∈ A such that T ⊂ S, let F(S|T ) be the set of alternatives in S \ T that induce
a feasible set together with the alternatives in T , i.e. F(S|T ) = {a ∈ S \T : T ∪{a} ∈ F}.
First, we show that for each S ∈ A, C(S, 1) = max(S,≻1). By contradiction suppose
that although a = max(S,≻1), we have C(S, 1) = b, where a 6= b. Since C(S, 1) = b
and a ∈ S, it follows that b RF1 a, which contradicts that a = max(S,≻1). Next, assume
that for some q ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we have for each S ∈ A and q′ < q, C(S, q′) coincides
with the lexicographic choice for (≻1, . . . ,≻q−1). Now, we show that for each S ∈ A,
C(S, q) \ C(S, q − 1) = max(F(S|C(S,q−1)),≻q). First, let a = max(F(S|C(S,q−1)),≻q). It
follows that a /∈ C(S, q − 1) and C(S, q − 1) ∪ {a} ∈ F . By contradiction, suppose that
a /∈ C(S, q). Since C(S, q − 1) ∪ {a} ∈ F , it follows from F -capacity-filling that there
exists x ∈ C(S, q) \ C(S, q − 1) such that x 6= a. Now, since C satisfies monotonicity,
x /∈ C(S, q − 1), and since x ∈ C(S, q), C(S, q − 1) ∪ {x} ∈ F . Therefore, we have
x RFq a, but this contradicts that a = max(F(S|C(S,q−1)),≻q). Thus, we conclude that C
is lexicographic for (≻1, . . . ,≻n).
4 Lexicographic Deferred Acceptance Mechanisms
Let N denote a finite set of agents, |N | = n ≥ 2. Let A be the collection of all nonempty
subsets of N . Let O denote a finite set of objects. Each agent i ∈ N has a complete,
transitive, and anti-symmetric preference relation Ri over O ∪ {∅}, where ∅ is the null
object representing the option of receiving no object (or receiving an outside option).
Given x, y ∈ O ∪ {∅}, x Ri y means that either x = y or x 6= y and agent i prefers x to y.
If agent i prefers x to y, we write x Pi y. Let R denote the set of all preference relations
over O∪{∅}, and RN the set of all preference profiles R = (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N ,
Ri ∈ R.
An allocation problem with capacity constraints, or simply a problem, consists of
a preference profile R ∈ RN and a capacity profile q = (qx)x∈O∪{∅} such that for each
object x ∈ O, qx ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and q∅ = n so that the null object has enough capacity to
accommodate all agents. Let P denote the set of all problems. Given a problem (R, q) ∈ P,
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an object x is available at the problem if qx > 0.
Given a capacity profile q = (qx)x∈O∪{∅}, an allocation assigns to each agent exactly
one object in O ∪ {∅} taking capacity constraints into account. Formally, an allocation
at q is a list a = (ai)i∈N such that for each i ∈ N , ai ∈ O∪ {∅} and no object x ∈ O ∪{∅}
is assigned to more than qx agents. Let M(q) denote the set of all allocations at q.
Given an allocation a = (ai)i∈N , a preference profile R, and an object x ∈ O ∪ {∅},
let Dx(a, R) = {i ∈ N : x Pi ai} denote the demand for x at (a, R), which is the set of
agents who prefer x to their assigned object.
A mechanism is a function ϕ : P →
⋃
q M(q) such that for each allocation problem
(R, q) ∈ P, ϕ(R, q) ∈M(q).
For mechanisms, we introduce the following property, which we call the irrelevance
of satisfied demand. Consider an arbitrary problem and the allocation chosen by the
mechanism at that problem. Suppose that the capacity of an object is increased. Now,
some of the agents who prefer that object to their assignments at the initial allocation
may receive the object due to the capacity increase. The irrelevance of satisfied demand
requires that the set of agents who receive the object due to the capacity increase does
not depend on the set of agents who initially receive the object. In other words, for two
problems with the same capacity, if the demands for an object are the same (note that the
set of agents who receive the object at those problems may be different), then whenever
the capacity of the object increases, the sets of agents who receive the object due to the
capacity increase should be the same for the two problems.
Formally, for each x ∈ O, let 1x be the capacity profile which has 1 unit of x and
nothing else. A mechanism ϕ satisfies the irrelevance of satisfied demand if for
each pair of problems (R, q) and (R′, q) and each object x ∈ O, if Dx(ϕ(R, q), R) =
Dx(ϕ(R
′, q), R′), then Dx(ϕ(R, q + 1x), R) = Dx(ϕ(R
′, q + 1x), R
′).
A (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice structure C = (Cx)x∈O asso-
ciates each object x ∈ O with a lexicographic choice rule Cx : A× {1, . . . , n} → A. Next,
we present the (capacity-constrained) lexicographic deferred acceptance algo-
rithm based on C. For each problem (R, q) ∈ P, the algorithm runs as follows:
Step 1: Each agent applies to his favorite object in O. Each object x ∈ O such that qx > 0
temporarily accepts the applicants in Cx(Sx, qx) where Sx is the set of agents who applied
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to x, and rejects all the other applicants. Each object x ∈ C such that qx = 0 rejects all
applicants.
Step r ≥ 2: Each applicant who was rejected at step r − 1 applies to his next favorite
object in O. For each object x ∈ O, let Sx,r be the set consisting of the agents who applied
to x at step r and the agents who were temporarily accepted by x at Step r − 1. Each
object x ∈ O such that qx > 0 accepts the applicants in Cx(Sx,r, qx) and rejects all the
other applicants. Each object x ∈ O such that qx = 0 rejects all applicants.
The algorithm terminates when each agent is accepted by an object. The allocation where
each agent is assigned the object that he was accepted by at the end of the algorithm is
called the C-lexicographic Deferred Acceptance allocation at (R, q), denoted by DAC(R, q).
Lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanisms: A mechanism ϕ is a lexicographic
deferred acceptance mechanism if there exists a lexicographic choice structure C such that
for each (R, q) ∈ P, ϕ(R, q) = DAC(R, q).
Ehlers and Klaus (2016), in their Theorem 3, characterize deferred acceptance mech-
anisms based on a choice structure satisfying capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and mono-
tonicity, with the following properties of mechanisms: unavailable-type-invariance (if the
positions of the unavailable types are shuffled at a profile, then the allocation should not
change); weak non-wastefulness (no agent receives the null object while he prefers an object
that is not exhausted to the null object),22 resource-monotonicity (increasing the capaci-
ties of some objects does not hurt any agent), truncation-invariance (if an agent truncates
his preference relation in such a way that his allotment remains acceptable under the trun-
cated preference relation, then the allocation should not change), and strategy-proofness
(no agent can benefit by misreporting his preferences). Next, we formally introduce these
properties and state Theorem 3 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016).
Unavailable-Type-Invariance: Let (R, q) ∈ P and R′ ∈ RN . If for each i ∈ N and
each pair of available objects x, y ∈ O (qx > 0, qy > 0) we have [x Ri y if and only if
x R′i y], then ϕ(R, q) = ϕ(R
′, q).
Weak Non-Wastefulness: For each (R, q) ∈ P, each x ∈ O such that qx > 0, and each
22The stronger version of this property, namely non-wastefulness, requires that no agent prefers an
object that is not exhausted to his assigned object. Note that capacity-filling and non-wastefulness are
similar in spirit, yet, capacity-filling is a property of a choice rule while non-wastefulness is a property of
a mechanism.
19
i ∈ N , if x Pi ϕi(R, q) and ϕi(R, q) = ∅, then |{j ∈ N : ϕj(R, q) = x}| = qx.
Resource-Monotonicity: For each R ∈ RN , and each pair of capacity profiles (q, q′), if
for each x ∈ O, qx ≤ q
′
x, then for each i ∈ N , ϕi(R, q
′)Ri ϕi(R, q).
Truncation-Invariance: Let (R, q) ∈ P and R′ ∈ RN . If for each i ∈ N and each
pair of objects x, y ∈ O we have [x Ri y if and only if x R
′
i y] and ϕi(R, q) R
′
i ∅, then
ϕ(R, q) = ϕ(R′, q).
Strategy-proofness: For each (R, q) ∈ P, each i ∈ N , and each R′i ∈ R, ϕi(R, q) Ri
ϕi((R
′
i, R−i), q).
Theorem 3 of Ehlers and Klaus(2016): A mechanism is a deferred acceptance mech-
anism based on a choice structure satisfying capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and mono-
tonicity if and only if it satisfies unavailable-type-invariance, weak non-wastefulness, resource-
monotonicity, truncation-invariance, and strategy-proofness.
The following impossibility result shows that the irrelevance of satisfied demand is
too strong: there is no mechanism which satisfies it together with the above desirable
properties.
Proposition 3. Suppose that there are at least three objects, |O| ≥ 3. There is no
mechanism which satisfies unavailable-type-invariance, weak non-wastefulness, resource-
monotonicity, truncation-invariance, strategy-proofness, and the irrelevance of satisfied
demand.
Proof. Suppose that there exists such a mechanism, say ϕ, which satisfies all the properties
in the statement except for the irrelevance of satisfied demand. We will show that it must
violate the irrelevance of satisfied demand. By Theorem 3 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016),
ϕ is a deferred acceptance mechanism based on a choice structure C = (Cx)x∈O which
satisfies capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and monotonicity.
Let i, j ∈ N be two distinct agents. We first claim that there exist two distinct objects
a, b ∈ O such that i ∈ Ca({i, j}, 1)∩Cb({i, j}, 1) and j /∈ Ca({i, j}, 1)∪Cb({i, j}, 1). That
is, when there is only one unit of a or b, i is chosen but j is not from {i, j}. To see this,
let x, y, z ∈ O be three distinct objects. By capacity-filling, either {i} = Cx({i, j}, 1) or
{j} = Cx({i, j}, 1). Without loss of generality, suppose that {i} = Cx({i, j}, 1). Again by
capacity-filling, either {i} = Cy({i, j}, 1) or {j} = Cy({i, j}, 1). If {i} = Cy({i, j}, 1), then
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we are done. Otherwise, by capacity-filling, either {i} = Cz({i, j}, 1) or {j} = Cz({i, j}, 1),
and in either case, we are done.
So, suppose that there exist two distinct objects a, b ∈ O such that i ∈ Ca({i, j}, 1)∩
Cb({i, j}, 1) and j /∈ Ca({i, j}, 1) ∪ Cb({i, j}, 1). Let the preference profiles R and R
′ be
such that every agent other than i and j find any object unacceptable and Ri, Rj, R
′
i and
R′j are as depicted below.
Ri Rj R
′
1 R
′
2
a b a a
b a b b
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Let q be such that qb = 1 and qx = 0 for any x ∈ O\{b}. Let q
′ be such that q′a = q
′
b = 1
and q′x = 0 for any x ∈ O \ {a, b}. Since ϕ is a deferred acceptance mechanism based on
C = (Cx)x∈O, Da(ϕ(R, q), R) = Da(ϕ(R
′, q), R′) = {i, j}. However, Da(ϕ(R, q
′), R) = ∅
and Da(ϕ(R
′, q′), R′) = {j}, implying that ϕ violates the irrelevance of satisfied demand.
Since the irrelevance of satisfied demand is too strong, we consider the following
weakening of it which requires that at any problem where there is only one available object,
the set of agents who receive the object due to a capacity increase does not depend on the
set of agents who initially receive the object.
Formally, a mechanism ϕ satisfies the weak irrelevance of satisfied demand if
for any pair of problems (R, q) and (R′, q) and each object x ∈ O such that for each
y ∈ O \ {x}, qy = 0, Dx(ϕ(R, q), R) = Dx(ϕ(R
′, q), R′) implies Dx(ϕ(R, q + 1x), R) =
Dx(ϕ(R
′, q + 1x), R
′).
Our next result shows that the weak irrelevance of satisfied demand together with
the above properties characterize lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanisms.
Proposition 4. A mechanism is a lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanism if and only
if it satisfies unavailable-type-invariance, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity,
truncation-invariance, strategy-proofness, and the weak irrelevance of satisfied demand.
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Proof. The following notation will be helpful. For each x ∈ O, let Rx be a preference
relation such that x is top-ranked and ∅ is second-ranked. For each S ∈ A that is nonempty,
let RxS be a preference profile such that for each i ∈ S, (R
x
S)i = R
x, and for each j /∈ S,
(RxS)j top-ranks ∅. For each x ∈ O and l ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let lx denote the capacity profile
where x has capacity l and every other object has capacity zero.
Let ϕ be a mechanism satisfying the properties in the statement of the theorem.
Let C = (Cx)x∈O be defined as follows. For each x ∈ O, S ∈ A, and l ∈ {0, . . . , n},
Cx(S, l) = {i ∈ S : ϕi(R
x
S, lx) = x}. This choice structure is the same as the one
constructed in the proof of Theorem 3 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016).
By weak non-wastefulness, Cx satisfies capacity-filling. By resource-monotonicity, Cx
satisfies monotonicity. By Lemma 2 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016), Cx satisfies gross substi-
tutes. By Theorem 3 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016), ϕ is a deferred acceptance mechanism
based on C. It is easy to see that, since ϕ satisfies the irrelevance of satisfied demand, for
each x ∈ O, Cx satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. Thus, C is a lexicographic
choice structure and ϕ is a lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanism.
Let ϕ be a lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanism. We will show that it sat-
isfies irrelevance of satisfied demand. The other properties follow from Theorem 3 of
Ehlers and Klaus (2016). Let C = (Cx)x∈O be a lexicographic choice structure such that
ϕ = DAC. Let (R, q), (R′, q) ∈ P and x ∈ O be such that for each y ∈ O \ {x}, qy = 0
and let T ≡ Dx(DA
C(R, q), R) = Dx(DA
C(R′, q), R′). Let Cx be lexicographic for the
priority profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Π. Let S(R) and S(R
′) be the sets of agents who prefer
x to ∅ at R and at R′, respectively. It is easy to see that DAC(R, q) = Cx(S(R), q),
DAC(R′, q) = Cx(S(R
′), q), and T = S(R) \Cx(S(R), q) = S(R
′) \Cx(S(R
′), q). Let i ∈ T
be the agent who is highest ranked according to ≻qx+1 in T . Clearly, DA
C(R, q + 1x) =
DAC(R, q)∪{i} and DAC(R′, q+1x) = DA
C(R′, q)∪{i}. Hence, Dx(DA
C(R, q+1x), R) =
Dx(DA
C(R′, q + 1x), R
′) = T \ {i}.
Remark 3. In Appendix C, we provide an example of a mechanism which satisfies all the
properties in the statement of Proposition 4 except for the irrelevance of satisfied demand,
and therefore which is not a lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanism.
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5 Implications for School Choice in Boston
In the Boston school choice system, there are two different priority orderings at each school:
a walk-zone priority ordering, which gives priority to the school’s neighborhood students
over all the other students, and an open priority ordering which does not give priority to
any student for being a neighborhood student. The Boston school district aims to assign
half of the seats of each school based on the walk-zone priority ordering and the other half
based on the open priority ordering. To achieve this aim, given the capacity, each school
chooses students in a lexicographic way according to a priority profile where half of the
priority orderings is the walk-zone priority ordering and the other half is the open priority
ordering.
In a recent study, Dur et al. (2013) note that two priority profiles with the same num-
bers of walk-zone and open priority orderings, but with different precedence orders of the
priority orderings, may result in different choices under a lexicographic choice procedure.
Starting with this observation, Dur et al. (2013) compare four different choice rules, one
of which is the one used in the Boston school district, in terms of how much they are
biased for or against the neighbourhood students. In this section, we will consider these
alternative choice rules from a different perspective. We will show that, although these
choice rules are all based on a “lexicographic procedure” at each capacity, only one of
them satisfies all the characterizing properties in Theorem 1, and therefore only one of
them is actually a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rule.
In order to put the four choice rules in a formal context, let us consider the following
class of choice rules which is larger than the class of lexicographic choice rules. We say that
a choice rule is capacity-wise lexicographic if there exists a list of priority orderings
for each capacity level (the number of priority orderings is the same as the capacity), and
at each capacity, the rule operates based on the associated list of priority orderings in a
lexicographic way. For a capacity-wise lexicographic choice rule, unlike a lexicographic
choice rule, the lists for different capacity levels are not necessarily related.
The capacity-wise lexicographic choice rules that can serve the Boston school district’s
purpose are the choice rules for which, at each capacity, the associated list consists of only
the walk-zone priority ordering and the open priority ordering, and the absolute difference
between the numbers of walk-zone and open priority orderings in the list is at most one.
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We formalize this property as follows.
Let ≻w and ≻o be walk-zone and open priority orderings. We say that a capacity-
wise lexicographic choice rule satisfies the Boston requirement for (≻w,≻o) if for each
capacity q, the associated list of priority orderings (≻1, . . . ,≻q) is such that
i. for each l ∈ {1, . . . , q}, ≻l∈ {≻
w,≻o},
ii. difference between the number of ≻w-priorities and ≻o-priorities is at most one, i.e.∣
∣
∣
∑q
i=1 1≻w(≻i)−
∑q
i=1 1≻o(≻i)
∣
∣
∣ ≤ 1.23
Now, it turns out that the following class of capacity-wise lexicographic choice rules
are the only rules satisfying our set of properties together with the Boston requirement
for (≻w,≻o).
Proposition 5. A capacity-wise lexicographic choice rule satisfies capacity-filling, gross
substitutes, monotonicity, the capacity-wise weak axiom of revealed preference, and the
Boston requirement for (≻w,≻o) if and only if it is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic for
a priority profile (≻1, . . . ,≻n) such that
i. for each l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ≻l∈ {≻
w,≻o},
ii. for each l that is odd, ≻l=≻
w if and only if ≻l+1=≻
o.
Proof. By Theorem 1, a choice rule satisfying the properties must be lexicographic. The
rest is straightforward.
Some examples of priority profiles satisfying (i) and (ii) in the statement of Proposition
5 are (≻w,≻o,≻w,≻o, . . .), (≻o,≻w,≻o,≻w, . . .), and (≻w,≻o,≻o,≻w,≻w,≻o,≻w,≻o, . . .).
Some examples that violate (ii) are (≻w,≻o,≻o,≻w,≻o,≻o, . . .) and (≻o,≻w,≻w,≻o,≻w
,≻w, . . .).
Four plausible choice rules stand out from the analysis of Dur et al. (2013), one of
which is currently in use in Boston (Open-Walk choice rule). Dur et al. (2013) compare
the below four choice rules in terms of how much they are biased for or against the
neighbourhood students. We will compare the four choice rules with respect to our set of
choice rule properties.
231x(y) is the indicator function which has the value 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise.
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1. Walk-Open Choice Rule: At each capacity, the first half of the priority orderings in
the list are the walk-zone priority ordering and the last half are the open priority
ordering.
2. Open-Walk Choice Rule: At each capacity, the first half of the priority orderings in
the list are the open priority ordering and the last half are the walk-zone priority
ordering.
3. Rotating Choice Rule: At each capacity, the first priority ordering in the list is the
walk-zone priority ordering, the second is the open priority ordering, the third is the
walk-zone priority ordering, and so on.
4. Compromise Choice Rule: At each capacity, the first quarter of the priority orderings
in the list are the walk-zone priority ordering, the following half of the priority
orderings in the list are the open priority ordering, and the last quarter are again
the walk-zone priority ordering.
To be precise, let us introduce the following procedures to accommodate the cases
where the capacity is not divisible by two or four.
• Walk-Open Choice Rule: If the capacity q is an odd number, the first q+1
2
are the
walk-zone priority ordering.
• Open-Walk Choice Rule: If the capacity q is an odd number, the first q+1
2
are the
open priority ordering.
• Compromise Choice Rule: If the capacity q is not divisible by four, let q = q′ + k
for some q′ that is divisible by 4 and some k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. If k = 1, let the first q
′
4
+ 1
orderings be the walk-zone priority ordering, the following q
′
2
orderings be the open
priority ordering, and the last q
′
4
orderings be the walk-zone priority ordering. If
k = 2, let the first q
′
4
+ 1 orderings be the walk-zone priority ordering, the following
q′
2
+ 1 orderings be the open priority ordering, and the last q
′
4
orderings be the walk-
zone priority ordering. If k = 3, let the first q
′
4
+1 orderings be the walk-zone priority
ordering, the following q
′
2
+ 1 orderings be the open priority ordering, and the last
q′
4
+ 1 orderings be the walk-zone priority ordering.
Note that all of the above rules satisfy the Boston requirement for (≻w,≻o). Since
all of the rules are capacity-wise lexicographic, they satisfy capacity-filling and gross sub-
stitutes. It follows from the only if part of Proposition 5 that, among these four choice
rules, only the Rotating Choice Rule satisfies capacity-filling, gross substitutes, monotonic-
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ity, and the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. However, it is not clear if the other three
rules are not lexicographic under variable capacity constraints because they fail to satisfy
monotonicity, the irrelevance of accepted alternatives or both. Next, we show that the
other three rules satisfy monotonicity, but they violate the irrelevance of accepted alterna-
tives. To show that these rules satisfy monotonicity, we first provide an auxiliary condition
that is easier to verify and sufficient for monotonicity. Next we introduce this condition
and prove that it is sufficient for monotonicity.
Let pi = (≻1, . . . ,≻q) and pi
′ = (≻′1, . . . ,≻
′
q+1) be priority lists of size q and q + 1,
respectively. We say that pi′ is obtained by insertion from pi if there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , q+
1} such that ≻′l=≻l for each l < k, and ≻
′
l=≻l−1 for each l > k. Note that when pi
′ is
obtained by insertion from pi, a new priority ordering is inserted into the list of priority
orderings in pi, by keeping relative order of the other priority orderings in the list the same.
It is possible that the new ordering is inserted in the very beginning or in the very end of
the list.
Lemma 2. Let C be a capacity-wise lexicographic choice rule. The choice rule C is
monotonic if for each q ∈ {2, . . . , n}, the priority list for q is obtained by insertion from
the priority list for q − 1.
Proof. Let (S, q) ∈ A × {1, . . . , n − 1}. Let pi = (≻1, . . . ,≻q) be the list for capacity q.
Let a ∈ C(S, q). Suppose that, in the lexicographic choice procedure, a is chosen at the
t’th step, i.e. a is chosen based on ≻t.
Let pi′ = (≻′1, . . . ,≻
′
q+1) be the list for capacity q+1 that is obtained by an insertion
from pi. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , q + 1} be such that ≻′l=≻l for each l < k, and ≻
′
l=≻l−1 for each
l > k.
Now, consider the problem (S, q + 1). If t < k, clearly a is still chosen at the t’th
step of the lexicographic choice procedure and thus a ∈ C(S, q + 1). Suppose that t ≥ k.
The rest of the proof is by induction. First, suppose that t = k. Note that at Step k of
the choice procedure for the problem (S, q + 1), the choice is made based on the inserted
priority ordering and at Step k + 1, the choice is made based on ≻t. Then, a is either
chosen at Step k, or at Step k + 1, the set of remaining alternatives is a subset of the set
of remaining alternatives at Step t of the choice procedure for (S, q) where a is chosen, in
which case a is still chosen. Thus, a ∈ C(S, q + 1).
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Now, suppose that t > k and each alternative that is chosen at a step t′ < t of the
choice procedure at (S, q) is also chosen at (S, q + 1). Then, a is either chosen before step
t+1 of the choice procedure for (S, q+1), or at Step t+1, the set of remaining alternatives
is a subset of the set of remaining alternatives at Step t of the choice procedure for (S, q)
where a is chosen, in which case a is still chosen. Thus, a ∈ C(S, q + 1).
Proposition 6. All of the four rules satisfy capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and mono-
tonicity, but only the rotating choice rule satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives
and only the rotating choice rule is (capacity-constrained) lexicographic.
Proof. Each rule is capacity-wise lexicographic (lexicographic for a given capacity) and
therefore satisfies capacity-filling and gross substitutes. Moreover, it is easy to see that
each of the four choice rules satisfies the insertion property, so monotonicity follows from
Lemma 2.
As for the irrelevance of accepted alternatives, first consider (≻1, . . . ,≻n) ∈ Π such
that the first priority ordering in the list is ≻w, the second is ≻o, the third is ≻w, and
so on. The rotating choice rule is clearly lexicographic for (≻1, . . . ,≻n). Moreover, by
Theorem 1, it satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives. We will show that each of
the other three choice rules violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Walk-Open Choice Rule: Let A = {a, b, c, d, e}. Let ≻w be defined as a ≻w b ≻w c ≻w
d ≻w e and ≻o be defined as e ≻o b ≻o d ≻o c ≻o a. Note that R({a, c, d, e}, 2) =
R({a, b, c, d}, 2) = {c, d}. However, R({a, c, d, e}, 3) = {d} and R({a, b, c, d}, 3) = {c},
and therefore C violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Open-Walk Choice Rule: Can be shown by interchanging the orderings for ≻w and ≻o in
the previous example.
Compromise Choice Rule: Let A = {a, b, c, d, x, y}. Let ≻w be defined as a ≻w b ≻w c ≻w
d ≻w x ≻w y and ≻o be defined as b ≻
o c ≻o y ≻o x ≻o d. Note that R({a, b, c, x, y}, 3) =
R({a, b, d, x, y}, 3) = {x, y}. However, R({a, b, c, x, y}, 4) = {y} and R({a, b, d, x, y}, 4) =
{x}, and therefore C violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Remark 4. Note that the particular procedures we introduced to accommodate the cases
where the capacity is not divisible by two or four are not crucial for the proof of Propo-
sition 6. For the other procedures (for example, for the walk-open choice rule, the extra
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priority when the capacity is odd can alternatively be set to be the open priority ordering),
the examples in the proof can simply be modified to show that the irrelevance of accepted
alternatives is still violated.
It follows from our Proposition 6 that if the irrelevance of accepted alternatives or
having a lexicographic representation under variable capacity constraints is deemed de-
sirable, then the rotating choice rule should be selected since it is the only choice rule
among the four plausible choice rules that satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives
together with capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and monotonicity.
Another interpretation of our Proposition 6 is the following. First of all, note that
in Dur et al. (2013), the capacity is fixed and a choice rule is defined given a capacity.
On the other hand, the capacity is allowed to vary and a choice rule has to specify which
alternatives are chosen from each choice set at each possible capacity in our approach,
which is the fundamental difference between Dur et al. (2013) and our study. The fact
that we allow the capacity to vary and we require a choice rule to respond to changes in
the capacity, allows us to define desirable properties of choice rules that address how it
should respond to changes in the capacity, such as monotonicity and the irrelevance of
accepted alternatives. Proposition 6 shows that, although each of the four rules in Dur et al.
(2013) operate based on a lexicographic procedure when we fix the capacity, in a variable
capacity framework only one of them satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives and
therefore only one of them is capacity-constrained lexicographic under variable capacities,
i.e., there exists a priority profile, which has as many priority orderings as the maximum
possible capacity, such that at each capacity, the rule operates based on a lexicographic
procedure with respect to the same priority profile.
6 Conclusion
Our formulation of a choice rule and the properties that we consider take into account
that the capacity may vary. When designing choice rules especially for resource allocation
purposes, such as in school choice, a designer may be interested in choice rules that respond
to changes in capacity. In that framework, our Theorem 1 shows that capacity-filling,
gross substitutes, monotonicity, and the irrelevance of accepted alternatives are altogether
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satisfied only by (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rules, which identifies the
properties that distinguish lexicographic choice rules from other plausible choice rules.
Besides providing an axiomatic foundation for lexicographic choice rules, this finding may
be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules, as we have illustrated in
Section 5, and also to understand characterizing properties of popular resource allocation
mechanisms, as we have illustrated in Section 4.
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Appendix
A Necessity of the Properties in Lemma 1
The following example shows that capacity-filling is necessary for the implication, that is,
there exists a choice rule which satisfies monotonicity and CWARP, but not the irrelevance
of accepted alternatives.
Example 2. Let A = {a, b, c}. Let ≻ be defined as a ≻ b ≻ c. Let the choice rule C be
defined as follows. For each problem (S, q), if a ∈ S, then C(S, q) = {a}; if a /∈ S, then
C chooses the highest ≻-priority alternatives from S until q alternatives are chosen or no
alternative is left. Note that C clearly violates capacity-filling and satisfies monotonicity
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and CWARP. Now, let S = {a, c} and S ′ = {b, c}. Note that R(S, 1) = R(S ′, 1) = {c},
C(S, 2)∩R(S, 1) = ∅, C(S ′, 2)∩R(S ′, 1) = {c}, and therefore C(S, 2)∩R(S, 1) 6= C(S ′, 2)∩
R(S ′, 1), implying that C violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
The following example shows that monotonicity is necessary for the implication, that
is, there exists a choice rule which satisfies capacity-filling and CWARP, but not the
irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Example 3. Let A = {a, b, c, d}. Let ≻ and ≻′ be defined as a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d and b ≻′ c ≻′
d ≻′ a. Let the choice rule C be defined as follows. For each problem (S, 1), C chooses
the highest ≻-priority alternatives from S; and for each problem (S, q) such that q > 1, C
chooses the highest ≻′-priority alternatives from S until q alternatives are chosen or no
alternative is left. Note that C clearly satisfies capacity-filling and CWARP. C violates
monotonicity because, for instance, a ∈ C({a, b, c}, 1) but a /∈ C({a, b, c}, 2). Now, let
S = {a, c, d} and S ′ = {b, c, d}. Note that R(S, 1) = R(S ′, 1) = {c, d}, C(S, 2)∩R(S, 1) =
{c, d}, C(S ′, 2) ∩ R(S ′, 1) = {c}, and therefore C(S, 2) ∩ R(S, 1) 6= C(S ′, 2) ∩ R(S ′, 1),
implying that C violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
The following example shows that CWARP is necessary for the implication, that is,
there exists a choice rule which satisfies capacity-filling and monotonicity, but not the
irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Example 4. Let A = {a, b, c, d}. Let ≻ and ≻′ be defined as a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d and
a ≻′ b ≻′ d ≻′ c. Let the choice rule C be defined as follows. For each problem (S, q) such
that a ∈ S, C chooses the highest ≻-priority alternatives from S until q alternatives are
chosen or no alternative is left; and for each problem (S, q) such that a /∈ S, C chooses
the highest ≻′-priority alternatives from S until q alternatives are chosen or no alternative
is left. Note that C clearly satisfies capacity-filling and monotonicity. Now, let S =
{a, c, d} and S ′ = {b, c, d}. Note that R(S, 1) = R(S ′, 1) = {c, d}, C(S, 2)∩R(S, 1) = {c},
C(S ′, 2) ∩ R(S ′, 1) = {d}, and therefore C(S, 2) ∩ R(S, 1) 6= C(S ′, 2) ∩ R(S ′, 1), implying
that C violates the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
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B Independence of Properties in Theorem 1
Violating only capacity-filling: Let A = {a, b, c}. Let ≻ be a priority ordering. Let C
be the choice rule such that, for each problem (S, q), C(S, q) is a singleton consisting of the
≻-maximal alternative in S. Note that C violates capacity-filling and clearly satisfies gross
substitutes. Since the choice does not vary with capacity, C also satisfies monotonicity and
the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Violating only gross substitutes: Let A = {a, b, c}. Let ≻ and ≻′ be defined as
a ≻ b ≻ c and b ≻′ a ≻′ c. Let the choice rule C be defined as follows. For each problem
(S, q), C(S, q) consists of the ≻-maximal alternative in S if q = 1 and c ∈ S; otherwise,
C(S, q) coincides with the choice rule that is responsive for ≻′. Note that C satisfies
capacity-filling.
Since a ∈ C({a, b, c}, 1) = {a} and a /∈ C({a, b}, 1) = {b}, C violates gross substitutes.
To see that C satisfies monotonicity, suppose that there exists a set S and an alternative
x ∈ S such that x ∈ C(S, 1) and x /∈ C(S, 2). Note that x /∈ C(S, 2) implies that x = c
and S = {a, b, c}. But then, x /∈ C(S, 1) = {a}, a contradiction. To see that C satisfies
CWARP, note that the revealed preference relation at q = 2 consists of a unique pair: b
is revealed preferred to c. Then, by Lemma 1, C also satisfies the irrelevance of accepted
alternatives.
Violating only monotonicity: Let A = {a, b, c}. Let ≻ be defined as a ≻ b ≻ c. Let
the choice rule C be defined as follows. For each problem (S, q), C(S, q) consists of the
≻-maximal alternative in S if q = 1; C(S, 2) = S if |S| = 2; and C({a, b, c}, 2) = {b, c}.
Note that C satisfies capacity-filling.
Since a ∈ C({a, b, c}, 1) and a /∈ C({a, b, c}, 2), C violates monotonicity. For q = 1,
C satisfies gross substitutes, since C maximizes ≻; for q ∈ {2, 3}, C clearly satisfies gross
substitutes. Since there are no two different problems with the same capacity and the same
set of rejected alternatives, C satisfies the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
Violating only CWARP: Note that three of the four rules that we discuss in Section 5
satisfy all the properties but the irrelevance of accepted alternatives.
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C Importance of the Irrelevance of Satisfied Demand
in Proposition 4
We provide an example of a mechanism which satisfies all the properties in the statement
of Proposition 4 except for the irrelevance of satisfied demand, and therefore which is
not a lexicographic deferred acceptance mechanism. The mechanism in the example is a
deferred acceptance mechanism based on a choice structure such that the choice rule of
each object is a walk-open choice rule. The example uses some arguments from the proof
of Proposition 6, where it was shown that the walk-open choice rule violates CWARP.
Example 5. Let N = {a, b, c, d, e} and let O be a finite set of objects. Let ≻w be defined
as a ≻w b ≻w c ≻w d ≻w e and ≻o be defined as e ≻o b ≻o d ≻o c ≻o a. Let (Cx)x∈O be
the choice structure such that for each object x ∈ O, Cx is the walk-open choice rule based
on (≻w,≻o). Let ϕ be the deferred acceptance mechanism based on the choice structure
(Cx)x∈O.
Since for each x ∈ O, Cx satisfies capacity-filling, gross substitutes, and monotonicity,
by Theorem 3 of Ehlers and Klaus (2016), ϕ satisfies unavailable-type-invariance, weak
non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation-invariance, and strategy-proofness.
Let x ∈ O. Let q be such that qx = 2 and for each y ∈ O \ {x}, qy = 0. Let R be such
that x is preferred to ∅ for all the agents except for b. Note that Dx(ϕ(R, q), R) = {c, d}
since Cx({a, c, d, e}, 2) = {a, e}. Let R
′ be such that x is preferred to ∅ for all the agents
except for e. Note that Dx(ϕ(R
′, q), R′) = {c, d} since Cx({a, b, c, d}, 2) = {a, b}. Thus,
Dx(ϕ(R, q), R) = Dx(ϕ(R
′, q), R′).
Now, we have Dx(ϕ(R, q + 1x), R) = {d} since Cx({a, c, d, e, 3}) = {a, c, e} and
Dx(ϕ(R
′, q + 1x), R
′) = {c} since Cx({a, b, c, d, 3}) = {a, b, d}. (Note that when q = 3, Cx
is lexicographic for (≻w,≻w,≻o).) Hence, ϕ violates the irrelevance of satisfied demand.
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D Responsive Choice
A well-known example of a lexicographic choice rule is a “responsive” choice rule,24 which is
lexicographic for a priority profile where all the priority orderings are the same. Formally, a
choice rule C is responsive for a priority ordering ≻ if for each (S, q) ∈ A×{1, . . . , n},
C(S, q) is obtained by choosing the highest ≻-priority alternatives in S until q alternatives
are chosen or no alternative is left. Note that C is responsive for ≻ if and only if it is
lexicographic for the priority profile (≻, . . . ,≻).
Chambers and Yenmez (2018b) characterize “responsive” choice rules, but in the con-
text of “classical” choice problems which do not explicitly refer to a variable capacity
parameter. Formally, a classical choice rule is a function C : A → A such that for each
S ∈ A, C(S) ⊆ S. A classical choice rule is responsive if there exists a priority ordering
≻ and a capacity q ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that for each S ∈ A, C(S) is obtained by choosing
the highest ≻-priority alternatives until the capacity q is reached or no alternative is left.
Chambers and Yenmez (2018b) show that a classical choice rule satisfies capacity-filling25
and the weaker axiom of revealed preference (WrARP) if and only if it is responsive.26
WrARP27 requires that for each pair a, b ∈ A and S, S ′ ∈ A such that a, b ∈ S ∩ S ′ ,
if a ∈ C(S) and b ∈ C(S ′) \ C(S), then a ∈ C(S ′).
To see what Chambers and Yenmez (2018b) implies in our variable capacity setup,
consider the following extension of WrARP to our setup.
Weaker axiom of revealed preference (WrARP): For each S, S ′ ∈ A, q ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and each pair a, b ∈ S ∩ S ′,
if a ∈ C(S, q) and b ∈ C(S ′, q) \ C(S, q), then a ∈ C(S ′, q).
24Responsive choice rules have been studied particularly in the two-sided matching context
(Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
25A classical choice rule satisfies capacity-filling if there exists a capacity such that at each choice
problem, an alternative is rejected only if the capacity is reached.
26Chambers and Yenmez (2018b) also provide a characterization of choice rules that are responsive for
a known capacity (namely q-responsive choice rules).
27WrARP was introduced by Jamison and Lau (1973) and also studied by Ehlers and Sprumont (2008).
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The following Proposition 7 directly follows from Chambers and Yenmez (2018b).
Proposition 7. A choice rule satisfies capacity-filling and the weaker axiom of revealed
preference if and only if for each q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a priority ordering ≻q such that
for each S ∈ A, C(S, q) is obtained by choosing the highest ≻q-priority alternatives until
the capacity q is reached or no alternative is left.
Proposition 7 states that capacity-filling andWrARP characterizes “capacity-wise
responsive” choice rules, which are responsive for each capacity, but the associated priority
orderings for different capacities may be different. Yet, a characterization of responsive
choice rules in our setup does not directly follow from Chambers and Yenmez (2018b).
We show that, the following extension ofWrARP, together with capacity-filling, char-
acterizes responsive choice rules in our variable-capacity setup. The property, called the
capacity-wise weaker axiom of revealed preference (CWrARP), requires that if an alterna-
tive a is chosen and b is not chosen at a problem where they are both available, then at
any problem where they are both available, a is chosen whenever b is chosen.
Capacity-wise weaker axiom of revealed preference (CWrARP): For each S, S ′ ∈
A, q, q′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and each pair a, b ∈ S ∩ S ′ ,
if a ∈ C(S, q) and b ∈ C(S ′, q′) \ C(S, q), then a ∈ C(S ′, q′).
Theorem 2. A choice rule is responsive if and only if it satisfies capacity-filling and the
capacity-wise weaker axiom of revealed preference.
Proof. It is clear that a responsive choice rule satisfies capacity-filling and CWrARP. Let
C be a choice rule satisfying capacity-filling and CWrARP. Clearly, CWrARP implies
WrARP, and therefore by Proposition 7, for each q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a priority ordering
≻q such that for each S ∈ A, C(S, q) is obtained by choosing the highest ≻q-priority
alternatives until the capacity q is reached or no alternative is left.
Let (S, q) ∈ A×{1, . . . , n}. If |S| ≤ q, then by capacity-filling, C(S, q) = S. Suppose
that |S| > q. First note that C(S, q − 1) ⊆ C(S, q), since otherwise, by capacity-filling,
there is a pair a, b ∈ S such that a ∈ C(S, q−1)\C(S, q) and b ∈ C(S, q)\C(S, q−1), which
contradicts CWrARP. Now, consider any pair a, b ∈ R(S, q−1) such that a ∈ C(S, q) and
36
b /∈ C(S, q). By CWrARP, for any S ′ ∈ A, b is not chosen over a at (S ′, q), implying that
a has ≻q-priority over b. But then, for each S ∈ A, C(S, q) is obtained by choosing the
highest ≻q−1-priority alternatives until the capacity q is reached or no alternative is left.
Since we started with an arbitrary q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, C is a choice rule that is responsive to
≻1.
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